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Governing
Massachusetts
Public Schools

Assessing the 1993
Massachusetts
Education Reform
Act

John Portz

The Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 created a number of important
changes in public education. In the area of local governance, the act was guided
by a corporate model in which authority and responsibilities were reallocated
among school committees, superintendents, principals, and newly created school
councils. School committees in particular assumed a policymaking role, and superintendents

became

based on responses

the chief executive officers of their school districts. This article,
to

a mail

sur\-ey, is

an early assessment of the act's governance

changes. Superintendents are most satisfied with their
ity

role,

especially their author-

over principals and teachers. School committee members are least satisfied

with the changes, although they

still provide general support for the goals of the
Although they are concerned about their job security under the ne^v system,
principals are supportive. A comparison of the corporate model of governance with
political leadership and shared governance models indicates that two important

act.

challenges

lie

ahead: developing support from other local political leaders and

fostering a cooperative environment

American
it is

also

public education

is

among

local governance actors.

one of the most central

institutions in our society, yet

one of the most troubled. Dissatisfaction with public schools

is

a recur-

theme in the media, among policymakers, and for the general public. Low test
scores, poor pedagogy, weak management, and a host of other criticisms are heard frequently. Proposed solutions are many. Various "waves" of reform, from statewide stan-

ring

dards to restructuring, have swept through school systems in recent years.

1

Criticisms,

however, continue.
Educational governance

is

on the

target

list

of problems as

weD

as solutions.

Gover-

nance, which involves the establishment of educational goals and the allocation of resources,

is

fraught with controversy and debate. Goal setting raises controversial ques-

tions about the very purpose of teaching

and learning; resource allocation involves the

contentious division of limited and often shrinking resources.

The

critique of school

governance ranges from the lack of parental and community participation in the governance process to incompetence of educational professionals
tively in the classroom. Solutions are equally

to deliver

broad from enhancing

with school vouchers to reallocating responsibilities

among

education effec-

the parental role

educational professionals.

John Portz. associate professor. Department of Political Science. Northeastern L'niversiry.
teaches and writes about state and local public policy, emphasizing education and economic development.
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This

article

of Public Policy

focuses on one piece of the governance debate: the allocation of author-

and responsibility among educational professionals and leaders at the local level.
My analysis is based on a case study of governance changes under the Massachusetts
ity

Education Reform Act of 1993. This

act,

described below, adopted a corporate model of

governance in which important educational responsibilities were reallocated among
superintendents, principals, school committee members, and school councils. Superintendents, for example,

became

the chief executive officers of school districts, while

school committees became policymaking boards. The following analysis, based on mail

survey responses from superintendents, school committee members, and principals,

an early assessment of these important changes under the

is

act.

Governance Models
Educational governance can be achieved in a variety of ways.
is

One prominent example
moved to the

a decentralization model in which governance responsibilities are

school level. 2 The thrust of this reform

movement

is

to shift decision

making around

goals and resource allocation to the individual school. School-based management, for

example, appears in various forms as a means to empower local school councils com-

posed of teachers, parents, and

principals.

Under school-based management, many of
made in each school building.

the key decisions that shape the learning environment are

Chicago, Miami, and other

A

cities

have experimented with

market model of governance, in which competition

this

governance reform.

the key dynamic, comprises

is

another popular reform. Vouchers and school choice, for example, are forms of gover-

nance in which schools compete for the attention of educational consumers, that

is,

parents and students. 3 In this competitive model, governance arrangements are a

byproduct of consumer choice. Successful governance

is

among

the attributes of those

schools which succeed in the educational market by attracting more students.

Many

popular reforms combine elements of both the market and decentralization

models. The charter school movement, for example, encourages competition

among

schools as well as a school-based approach to educational governance. Charter schools
operate under a contractual arrangement with public authorities, but they are outside the
direct supervision of traditional public school authorities
to alter curriculum, hours,
is

another reform

and have increased

flexibility

and other aspects of the learning environment. 4 Privatization

movement

that builds

upon these models,

particularly the market

model. In Baltimore, for example, the private firm of Educational Alternatives,

Inc.,

was hired to operate a number of schools in the city school system. 5
The traditional governance model, however, focuses more squarely on public-sector
actors. Superintendents, local school boards,
legislators, governors,

mayors,

state

boards of education, state

and even members of the U.S. Department of Education are pub-

he actors who assume governance roles. Debates over governance reform often center
on the proper allocation of authority and responsibility among these various players in a
federal system.
traditional governance model at the local level. One
model of governance, is the focus of this article. 6 Central to this
model is a clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities among governance actors.
School board members, for example, concentrate on the broad issues of educational
policy; superintendents focus on implementing board policies. Each governance performer should be held accountable for his or her actions and responsibilities. As the

There are three variations of the

variation, a corporate

126

chief legislative sponsor of the Massachusetts Education

Reform Act

writes, "Account-

7

the key to successful education reform." With the business world as a guide,

ability is

the corporate

model argues for a separation of policy and management

that

is

character-

istic of the relationship between a corporation's board of directors and the chief execu-

tive officer.

Shared governance

is

a second variation of the traditional model. Rather than empha-

and

size a sorting out of authority
lights dialogue

and resource allocation are shared

ting

become

critical.

9

responsibilities;

8

it

high-

model goal setcommunication and cooperation
actors.

In this

School committee members and superintendents, for example, must

develop a high level of

and

model,

responsibilities, as in the corporate

and interdependence among governance

trust

and respect

tasks. Similarly, superintendents

that facilitates the sharing of responsibilities

and principals become partners

in the

of the school system. Collective, rather than individual, accountability

management

characteristic

is

of this model. Shared governance can even be expanded to include community actors,
thereby creating networks in which collaboration and creative dialogue
cal.

become

criti-

10

A

on political leadership. In Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, and
mayors have assumed a central governance role in their respective
In Boston, for example, Mayor Thomas Menino appoints members of

third variation focuses

several other cities,

school systems. 11

the school committee

and has taken a leading role

allocation of resources.

As

the

your mayor by what happens
accountable ... If

major role

I fail,

mayor

now

judge

in his city's schools.

me

stated in a

in the

in educational goal setting

1996 speech,

"I

Boston public schools.

harshly."

12

I

want

to be

and the

judged as

expect you to hold

The mayor of Chicago has

also

me

assumed a

Labeled by one group of researchers as "integrated

Mayor Richard Daley

governance," this centralization of authority under

appoints

mem-

bers of the school board and exercises considerable control over the allocation of re-

sources to the schools. 13

Local Level Educational Governance: Education Reform

The Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 covered a broad range of educational
activities,

including school finance, teacher certification, learning standards, and cur-

riculum models as well as governance. In the

guided the reform
explaining the act,

efforts.

As

"We view

the state

last area, the

corporate model clearly

Department of Education notes

in a publication

the school committee as the publicly elected or appointed

equivalent of a board of directors of a corporation

.

.

.

[and] the superintendent serves as

the school committee's chief executive officer and educational advisor." 14

With

this

were reallocated among four local bodies:
school committees, superintendents, principals, and newly created school councils.
The major reform thrust for school committees is an emphasis on their policymaking
role. Their major responsibilities are to

model

as a guide, governance responsibilities

and policies;

•

establish educational goals

•

negotiate and approve collective bargaining agreements;

•

vote on school choice policy;

•

adopt general disciplinary policies;

•

approve

all

school department expenditures;
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•

review and approve the budget;

•

hire superintendent

•

establish

•

establish performance standards for all personnel;

•

adopt a professional development plan for

The most
cipals

of Public Policy

and several other identified districtwide personnel;

compensation policy for principals;

significant authority

and teachers.

A

names of candidates

all

and

personnel.

removed from school committees

for principal

As

the hiring of prin-

and teaching positions.

Superintendents, on the other hand, assume administrative and
sibilities.

is

superintendent no longer submits to the school committee the

management respon-

chief executive officer of the schools, superintendents are responsible for

the day-to-day operations of their school districts. In this context,

major

responsibilities

include:

•

appointing principals and other personnel not assigned to specific

•

reviewing and approving the appointment of teachers and staff proposed

schools;

by

principals;

•

publishing the school committees' district policies on teacher and

•

recommending employee performance standards

student conduct;
to the school

commit-

tees;
9

maintaining records on

all

students and staff and filing a detailed

annual report;
•

reviewing and approving the process for the formation of school
councils; and

•

overseeing the general operation of their school

The most

new responsibilities for superintendents are in the personnel
now have total authority over hiring principals and indirect con-

significant

area. Superintendents
trol

districts.

over hiring teachers.

Principals are also recognized as key actors in school governance. Although they are

appointed by superintendents, each of them has considerable authority over the allocation of resources within his or her school building.

•

Major

responsibilities include:

administering and managing resources within the school;

•

suspending and expelling students;

•

hiring and firing

all

teachers and school

staff,

subject to approval of

the superintendent, relevant collective bargaining agreements, and state

law;
•

establishing and serving as cochair of the school council.

Increased accountability

They exercise
for teaching

is

the purported

theme of the Reform Act for

principals.

greater authority over school personnel and are individually accountable

and learning in

their school buildings. Significantly, principals, defined as

managers, can no longer engage in collective bargaining. Each principal negotiates an
individual

employment contract (up to three years) with his or her superintendent.
Reform Act required the creation of a school council in each school

Finally, the

128

in

.

community members,
Through the councils the Reform Act
encourages the participation and involvement of parents, teachers, and community
members in the governance of individual schools. The major responsibilities of coun-

composed of

the state. These councils are
principals,

and

at

teachers, parents,

the high school level, students.

cils include:

advising the principal in setting educational goals and school policies,

•

as well as reviewing the school budget;

and

preparing and reviewing an annual school improvement plan.

•

Evaluating the Impact of Governance Changes
To assess the impact of these changes, I sent a survey questionnaire to all Massachusetts school committee members, superintendents, and principals. Of the 4,310 questionnaires mailed, 957 (22 percent) were returned. (See Appendix A for a discussion of
the survey.) In addition to demographic questions, the survey posed a number of questions concerning governance changes under the Education Reform Act. Questions
probed the

level

of satisfaction with a respondent's governance

role, the

impact and

importance of governance changes, and the support for or opposition to other possible

governance changes.

My

analysis focused on the similarities and differences

among

responses by the three local governance actors. Their impressions and self-reported
experiences of educational professionals and leaders form the basis for the following

assessment of the corporate governance model adopted in Massachusetts.

General Assessment of Roles
On a measure of general "satisfaction" with

governance

their

role, superintendents are

most satisfied with changes under the Education Reform Act. Survey respondents were asked, "How satisfied are you in your current governance role?" The

clearly the

average responses for

all

three groups are provided in Table

1

Table 1

Satisfaction in Current

Governance Role
Satisfied

Dissatisfied

2

1

4

3

School committees
Superintendents

3.2

4.0
3.3

Principals

The

feeling of satisfaction

4.0. In fact,

5

among

superintendents

is striking:

75 percent of superintendents circled 4 or

dissatisfaction

by

circling

1

or

2.

To be

certain,

5;

an average score of

only 9 percent expressed

some superintendents complained of

continuing micromanagement by school committees, but the overall level of satisfaction is quite high.

In contrast, school committee

members

are the least satisfied

among

the three types

of governance actors. In response to the same question, the average response
3.2.

Only 43 percent of school committee members
129

circled

4 or

5,

is

only

while 33 percent
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expressed dissatisfaction by circling

or 2. Principals

1

lie in

the middle on this measure

of satisfaction, with an average score of 3.3. In response to the question, 52 percent of

4 or

principals circled

A

5,

and 29 percent circled

1

or

2.

second question concerning general governance roles reveals a similar trend.

Question 3 of the survey uses a
tion of

to 5 scale for the following question: "In the alloca-

1

governance responsibilities in your

district,

how would you

rate the role of each

of the following [school committee, superintendent, principal, school council]."

12

Too Weak

From

viewed

highest self-assessment score

4

3

this perspective, 81 percent

right"; only 13 percent

Too Strong

Just Right

5

of superintendents describe their role as "just

on the weak side of the scale

it

among

(1

and

2).

This was the

three groups. Furthermore, superintendents

all

look favorably on the role of the other two governance categories. With respect to the

view the principal's role

role of principals, for example, 85 percent of superintendents
as "just right."

The

role of school committees rates a slightly lower 75 percent "just

right" score, while school councils score

70 percent on the same measure. In general,

superintendents appear to be quite satisfied with their role as chief executive officer of a

school system.

School committees, again, show a sharp contrast and different assessment of their

governance

role. In assessing

while 53 percent rate

it

weak

it,

only 41 percent of the members rate

(scores

and

1

2). Clearly,

concerns over their role in governance. Not surprisingly,
roles of other

as "just right,"

this

members have

cohort also questions the

governance participants. Although 48 percent of committee members

view the superintendent's role as
it

it

school committee

"just right,"

on the strong side (scores 4 and

5).

an almost equal number, 44 percent, rate

For principals, the picture presents a greater

split:

51 percent of the members view the principals' role as "just right," with the remainder
divided between

weak and

strong. Finally, 41 percent of school

view school councils as weak (scores
Principals again

fall in

,

committee members

while 37 percent rate them "just right."

superintendents. In assessing their

own

role, a

bare

39 percent of principals
offer a self-assessment on the weak side of the scale. In light of this judgment, a significant number of principals view the role of other governance actors as too strong. With
majority,

52 percent,

and 2)

the middle, although their assessment lies closer to that of

members than of

school committee

1

rate their role as "just right." In contrast,

school committees, for example, 53 percent of principals perceive the committee role as
"just right," while

35 percent perceive

it

as strong.

The

pattern is almost identical for

superintendents: 52 percent of principals consider the superintendent's role as "just

while 37 percent consider it as strong. With school councils, however, principals
more sympathetic. For these partners at the school level, 62 percent of principals
think their role is "just right," while 29 percent think it is weak.
right,"

are

Assessing the Importance of Changes

To

assess the relative importance of specific changes under the Massachusetts Educa-

tion

Reform Act,

the survey uses a

1

to 5 scale for the following question: "Listed

below are major governance changes under the Education Reform Act. Regardless of
the impact on your district, how important do you think each is in improving educa-

130

tional

governance?" The tables below

list

the average response for the three types of

governance personnel.

School Committees and Superintendents

One

of the most important changes under the Education Reform Act involves a shift in

school committee responsibility from general hiring decisions to a policymaking board
that hires only the superintendent.

The companion

to this

change

is

the assumption of

authority by superintendents to hire principals and teachers. These two changes are
central to the corporate

model

that

was instrumental

in

guiding reform legislation:

board of directors (school committee) making policy and chief executive officer (superintendent) responsible for hiring.

The assessment of each change

is

reported in Tables 2 and

3.

Each change was

per-

ceived as quite important in school governance, particularly by superintendents. For

both survey questions, the average response for superintendents

In the case of

is 4.8.

each question, 85 percent of superintendents circled 5 on the response
school committee

members

Their average response

is

3.8 or 3.9 for these questions. For the

percent of school committee
percent did so. Principals

scale. In contrast,

are less inclined to view this change as very important.

members

fall

circled 5,

first question, only 39
and for the second question only 35

between the two, although they are more closely aligned

is 4.6 and 4.4, respectively, for the
two changes. In general, the responses indicate a fairly strong endorsement of the corporate model of governance, although school committee members have significant

with superintendents. Their average response rating

reservations.

Table 2

Hiring Authority
(School committees' focus on policy and budget with less hiring authority)

Not Important
1

Very Important

4

3

2

School committees
Superintendents

5

3.9
4.8

4.6

Principals

Table 3

Superintendents' Responsibility for Hiring Principals
Not Important
1

Very Important

4

3

2

School committees
Superintendents

5

3.8
4.8

Principals

4.4
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Principals

For principals, several of the changes under the act are greeted with considerable support. In particular, those

which enhance the authority of principals are perceived

as

important to educational governance. The authority of principals to hire teachers, for

example, receives strong endorsement (see Table
pals

is 4.8,

with 82 percent of principals circling

supportive of this change. Their average response
surprisingly, school
less

The average response

4).
5.

is 4.6,

with 71 percent circling

committee members, who lose authority under

important to improving governance. Their average response

percent circled

for princi-

Superintendents are also highly
5.

this

change, see

is 4.0,

and only 38

Not
it

as

5.

Table 4

Principals' Responsibility for Hiring

Teachers
Very Important

Not Important
4

3

2

1

School committees
Superintendents

5

4.0

4.6
4.8

Principals

Enhanced

authority for principals over student discipline receives an approximately

similar level of support
bers, principals,

from

all parties.

As Table

5 indicates, school committee

and superintendents gave an average response of either 4.1 or

mem-

4.3.

Table 5

Principals' Authority

over Student Discipline
Very Important

Not Important

4

3

2

1

School committees
Superintendents

5
4.1

4.3
4.3

Principals

One

final

change regarding principals, namely,

their

removal from collective bar-

by them (see
deemed by many
by superintendents. The

gaining, receives less support as important to governance, particularly

Table

This controversial provision in the Education Reform Act

6).

principals to

be a removal of protections from arbitrary actions

is

principals' average response is only 3.2. Equally significant, 33 percent of principals

circled

1

,

On the other hand, many
members regarded this change as an important
accountability. The average response of both of these

indicating strong sentiment against this change.

superintendents and school committee
step in enhancing principals'

groups

is 4.0.

132

9

Table 6

Principals' Loss of Collective Bargaining
Not Important

Very Important
4

3

2

1

School committees

5

4.0

Superintendents

4.0

3.2

Principals

School Councils

A

final area

of change involves the creation of school councils. These site-based advi-

sory groups are newly created under the Education

councils

is fairly

Reform Act. Support

for school

consistent across respondents (see Tables 7 and 8), although the level

of importance in educational governance

is

less than that attributed to several other

changes, particularly the changes in policymaking and personnel responsibilities.

Table 7

School Councils' Advice to Principals
Not Important

Very Important

4

3

2

1

School committees
Superintendents

5

3.8

3.9
3.7

Principals

Table 8

School Councils and Principals' Development
of

Improvement Plans

Not Important
1

Very Important

4

3

2

School committees
Superintendents

3

5

.

4.1

4.0

Principals

Possible Changes in Educational Governance

made under the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, a
number of other governance reforms are under consideration or are the subject of deIn addition to the changes

bate.

Another part of the survey used a

for the following question: "Listed

1 to 5 scale (strongly oppose to strongly support)
below are possible changes in educational gover-

nance and policymaking. Would you support or oppose these changes?"

School Committees
For school committees, one possible change
rily the

is

to restore their hiring authority, prima-

choice of principals. Survey respondents were asked whether they supported or
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opposed allowing school committees to vote on the hiring and dismissal of principals.
Under the new Education Reform Act, superintendents have sole responsibility in this
area. Not surprisingly, this change receives support from school committee members,
with an average response of 3.8, but strong opposition from superintendents, whose
average response

In fact, 70 percent of superintendents, indicating their strong

is 1.5.

opposition, circled

1.

Principals, 51 percent of

whose responses

to a hiring process that

opens their appointment to the scrutiny of school committees circled

1,

were also

strongly opposed to this change (see Table 9).

Table 9

Should School Committees Vote on Hiring
and Dismissing Principals?
Strongly

Oppose

School committees
Superintendents

4

3

5

3.8
1.5

Principals

2.1

One method

of limiting the likely scope of school committee action

school committees to quarterly
10).

Strongly Support

Neutral
2

1

meetings —

—

School committee members, not surprisingly, strongly oppose such

Their average response

is 1 .4,

however, find more merit in

sympathy with a change

with 80 percent of them circling

this proposal.

that

restricting

also sparks divergent responses (see Table

1

.

restrictions.

Superintendents,

Their average response score of 3.7 indicates

might lessen micromanagement of the school system by

the school committee. Principals, with an average response of 3.3, evidence a
neutral position

on

this

more

change.

Table 10

Limiting School Committees to Quarterly Meetings
Strongly Oppose

School committees

Strongiy Support

Neutral
2

1

4

3

1.4

Superintendents
Principals

5

3.7
3.3

Finally, a

than election

more

radical change in choosing school committees

— receives general opposition from

— appointment

all parties, particularly

rather

school com-

whose average response is 1.8 (see Table 11). It appears that despite
by former governor William Weld, this concept and Boston's experiment
with an appointed committee have little advocacy among local educational leaders

mittee members,
their support

around the

state.

134

Table 11

Allowing Local Communities to Appoint School Committees
Oppose

Strongly

School committees

Strongly Support

Neutral

4

3

2

1

5

1.8

Superintendents

2.1

2.6

Principals

Superintendents

Two

possible changes in the responsibility and authority of superintendents receive
mixed responses. One proposed change is to require superintendents to negotiate labor
contracts, which is currently the responsibility of school committees. It can be argued,

however, that

this is

not an appropriate function for a policymaking board. Rather,

it is

management function that should rest with the chief executive officer of the corporation. Such a proposal draws divergent responses (see Table 12), with school committee
members generally opposed (2.5), principals in favor (4.1), and superintendents slightly
a

opposed

(2.8).

Table 12

Requiring Superintendents to Negotiate Labor Contracts
Strongiy Oppose

Strongly Support

Neutral

4

3

2

1

School committees

5

2.5

Superintendents

2.8

Principals

A

4.1

second change would reduce superintendents' authority by removing the require-

ment

that a superintendent approve the hiring

Reform Act,

cation

and dismissal of teachers. Under the Edu-

principals have primary responsibility for teacher personnel deci-

sions, but superintendents retain final approval authority. This

quite strong opposition
(1.6).

port

is

(2.0)

proposed change draws

and superintendents

whom 70 percent
on the survey. Principals generally support this change, but their level of supmild (3.3) compared with the opposition of the other two groups.

Opposition

circled

from school committee members

is

particularly strong

among

superintendents, of

1

Table 13

Allowing Principals Sole Authority to Hire and
Strongly Oppose

School committees
Superintendents

Teachers

Strongly Support

Neutral

4

3

2

1

Fire

5

2.0
1.6

3.3

Principals

Principals

The

authority and responsibility of principals

One proposed change,

to involve

them

is

another important governance area.

in the teachers' collective bargaining process,

135
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designed to enhance the accountability of principals. Since collective bargaining contracts
often restrict the authority of principals and other administrators, a role for principals

The

in the process appears logical.

School committee members,

oppose such a change

(2.6),

who

reaction, however,

probably perceive

is

mixed among respondents.
a loss of authority, tend to

this as

and principals generally support

group stakes out a strong position on

(3.6)

it,

although neither

this issue.

Table 14

Allowing Principals to Participate in
Teachers' Collective Bargaining
Strongly

Oppose

Strongly Support

Neutral

4

3

2

1

School committees

2

5

.

Superintendents

3.2
3.6

Principals

Job security

a second important issue for principals.

is

Act, principals are

no longer allowed

themselves of concomitant job protections.
their positions

minimum

and a change

that

Under

the Education

to participate in collective bargaining

Many

undermines

Reform

and

avail

principals perceive this as threat to

their accountability.

A

proposal to require

two-year contracts for principals receives support or a neutral response (see

Table 15). Support by principals

is

particularly strong (4.6); 73 percent of them circled 5.

Table 15

Requiring
Strongly

Minimum Two-year Contracts for Principals

Oppose

Strongly Support

Neutral
2

1

School committees
Superintendents

4

3

5

3.1

3.4

Principals

4.6

School Councils

A

general reluctance to expand the scope of governance

is

evident in a question that

proposes to give school councils authority over a portion of the school budget. School
councils possess only advisory authority under the act; they lack the decision-making

and financial authority

that is often sought

This proposal, however,
16).

is

by advocates of school-based management.

generally opposed by educational professionals (see Table

Superintendents (2.0) and school committee

thwart such a diminution of their authority.
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members

(2.2), in particular,

tend to

Table 16

Giving School Councils Authority over
Part of the School Budget
Strongly

Oppose

School committees

2.2

Superintendents

2.0

Strongly Support

Neutral

4

3

2

1

5

2.8

Principals

Other Changes

more evident when the
more authority in collective bargaining.
the mayor
Under the Education Reform Act, the chief executive in each city or town
sits with the school committee to vote on collective bargaining
or town manager
contracts. The intent of this provision is to involve municipal officials, who are responThe reluctance

proposal

is

to share governance responsibilities is even

made

to allow municipal officials

—

—

sible for the allocation

in determining

how

of funds to

all

departments, including the schools, a greater role

funds are spent. Education leaders, particularly superintendents,

oppose an expansion of authority for municipal

officials (see

Table 17).

Table 17

Increasing Municipal Officials' Authority
in Collective Bargaining

Oppose

Strongly

Strongly Support

Neutral

School committees

4

3

2

1

5

2.3

Superintendents

1.6

2.4

Principals

A final proposal reveals

a general ambivalence on the part of local education leaders

toward significant changes within the school system. This proposal would enable local
districts to establish within-district charter schools.

Like Boston's pilot schools, the

would be exempt from many regulations and procedures mandated by
the district office and labor contracts, but the individual schools would still be part of
the local school district. This proposal receives a generally neutral response from recharter schools

spondents, although superintendents indicate mild support (see Table 18).
Table 18

Allowing Local
Strongly Oppose
1

School committees
Superintendents
Principals

Districts to Establish Charter

Strongly Support

Neutral
2

Schools

4

3
3.1

3.4
3.0
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In general, governance changes under the Massachusetts Education

Reform Act of 1993

receive support from educational leaders at the local level. Superintendents, particularly,
are satisfied with their

new

and responsibilities

role

school system. School committee

members and

as the chief executive officers of the

principals express a

but they also are generally supportive of the overall thrust of the

One
ity

—

of

is

its

most important changes

— the

number of concerns,

act.

reallocation of hiring and dismissal author-

supported by governance actors, albeit with some significant reservations. Un-

der reallocation, school committees are restricted to hiring and dismissing superintendents (and a few others in districtwide positions); superintendents,

have

principals,

pals

final approval of teachers

who

hire

and dismiss

and other school-based personnel; and princi-

assume primary responsibility for hiring and dismissing teachers and others

in their

buildings.

Schools are slowly adjusting to this

new

allocation of responsibilities.

Thus

far,

superintendents appear to be most satisfied with their role. Their authority over the key
official at

each school, the principal,

is

A

enhanced considerably.

majority of school

committee members, on the other hand, are concerned about their loss of authority over
personnel, particularly principals. In fact, 68 percent of school committee

members

support (circled 4 or 5) resumption of their power to hire and dismiss principals. Principals, for their part, strongly endorse their authority to hire

and dismiss teachers, thereby

enhancing their accountability for the quality of teaching.

Some

principals, however,

remain troubled about collective bargaining restrictions and legal roadblocks to dismissing teachers.

As one elementary

principal writes,

"Why

not put teachers on the

one-to-three-year contracts and abolish tenure and professional status?

Do

that

same
and

you'll revolutionize education overnight."

Furthermore,

many

principals are disturbed about their

A common refrain

new

status outside collective

whims of the superinAs another elementary principal writes, changes should be made to "reduce a
superintendent's power
absolute power corrupts; principals are at the mercy of super-

bargaining.
tendent.

is

that they are vulnerable to the

—

Emphasizing

intendents."

requiring a

this point,

minimum two-year

88 percent of principals support (circled 4 or 5)

contract for individuals in their position.

School councils, newly created under the Education Reform Act, receive general
support from participants in the survey. School improvement plans, which are approved

by school councils, also receive a favorable rating. One principal writes, "The school
improvement plan helps to bring together the vision, goals, and objectives for the
school from principal, staff, and parents."
In general, school committee

members, superintendents, and principals favor many

of the act's reforms, but they are also cautious and protective of their authority and
position.

When

faced with reforms that might alter the balance of power, local actors

are typically

opposed or

posed by

three groups. Similarly,

cils is

all

neutral.

Appointed school committees, for example, are op-

more extensive budget

authority for school coun-

opposed, chiefly by school committees and superintendents. All three groups are

opposed

to granting municipal officials

more

authority in the collective bargaining

process, and they are generally neutral about the prospect of creating within-district
charter schools. For these educational leaders, there are limits to the acceptable scope

of educational reform. Future legislative proposals to

need

alter the

governance framework

to take this cautious perspective into consideration or risk strong opposition
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from

major educational constituencies.

The Massachusetts Education Reform Act is inspired by a corporate model of educaThe essence of this model is a sorting-out or demarcation of responsibilities among governance actors. A policymaking board of directors, the local school
committee, and a managing chief executive officer, the superintendent, are central to
tional governance.

this

model. In addition, school principals are to take charge of their individual build-

ings,

and school councils provide a forum for

teacher, parent, student,

and community

input to the decision-making process.

On

the basis of the self-assessments of school committee members, superintendents,

and principals, the Education Reform Act has generally been effective

in clarifying

governance responsibilities and enhancing accountability. However, major challenges

he ahead. In

fact,

outlined earlier

Each

the

—

two other

variations of the public-sector approach to governance

political leadership

— point

and shared governance

to

two of them.

variant points to a different piece of reality in the world of educational gover-

nance.

From

a political leadership perspective, the key challenge

among

support for public education from
schools. This

is

political

is

the development of

and community leaders outside the

an external concern generally lacking in the corporate model, which

instead focuses on policy development and

management within

the school system.

School committees focus on educational policies; superintendents concentrate on

systemwide administrative and management

own

responsibilities;

and principals are con-

Under a corporate model, fostering
broad political support from external constituencies in the community is not central to
the tasks of these governance actors. Mayors and city councillors, for example, are not
of major concern from a corporate model perspective. Indeed, this model eschews the
political world for the bias and influence that it might exert over a policy and management process which should focus on educational rather than political matters.
The political leadership model, however, poses a different reality in which broad
cerned with the operations of their

school.

political support for education is critical.

This perspective

is

particularly pertinent in

Massachusetts, whose school districts are fiscally dependent on local governments. The
latter,
all

composed of

city councils,

mayors, managers, and others, must approve the over-

school appropriation. If the schools lose favor with these political leaders, the school

budget

suffers.

Of course,

the funding formula of the Education

Reform Act requires a
minimum. To

certain level of local fiscal support for the schools, but this is essentially a

go beyond

this level, local

government leaders must be convinced

additional funding. Thus, governance actors

must add

that the schools merit

to their duties the political tasks

of seeking and lobbying for support, particularly fiscal support, from these leaders.
In this context,

it is

interesting to note that

Boston stands apart from other

state

com-

munities, for, unlike other school districts' system of independently electing school

committees, the city's mayor appoints the members. Boston thus benefits from a
cal leadership

approach to governance that has translated into considerable

administrative support for the school system.

As noted

earlier,

Boston's

politi-

fiscal

and

Mayor Menino

has staked his political future on improving the schools.

The second major challenge
this perspective, the critical

mutual respect. As

is

apparent from the shared governance approach.

concern

is

how

to build

From

an environment of cooperation and

model emphasizes, governance in local school districts often
and sorting-out rationale of the corporate perspective. As one
educational association notes, "[The] line between policy and administration is rarely
this

defies the demarcation
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Dialogue and interdependence can be as important as division of authority

responsibilities.

The

question, then,

is

cooperative environment while retaining

whether the corporate model can foster

its

this

emphasis on the policy-management distinc-

tions.

A

major challenge

to building a cooperative

environment comes from suspicions and

among governance actors. Under the Education Reform Act, for example, the
job insecurity noted by many principals can be disruptive to the development of shared
governance. Many principals perceive their position as subject to the whims of the superintendent. The act's intent is to make principals more accountable for their schools, but
divisions

so mandating,
result has not

it

also increases the authority of superintendents over principals.

cipal noted, policymakers

much

A

The

always been a more cooperative environment for governance. As one prin-

need

to "rethink collective bargaining for principals

— we are

too vulnerable in our present position."

Public

Agenda Foundation study

ing a cooperative environment

about curricula, textbooks,

tests,

raised a similar point in

its

conclusion that build-

16
the critical step in educational reform.

is

"Good

ideas

financing and governance will founder if the parties

who must implement them

cannot get along." 17

pared his school

a "giant dysfunctional family," while in several communities

district to

surveyed, educational reform

fell

One

superintendent in this study com-

"victim to division, factionalism, and gridlock." 18 In

Massachusetts as well, fostering a cooperative environment

is difficult.

As one

superin-

tendent notes, "There has been a distinct and open polarization of school committees

and superintendents. In

fact,

Education Reform has created an even greater and more

intense political climate."

The challenge is formidable. A cooperative governance arrangement implies that all
work together and that accountability is collective. From this perspective, school

sectors

committees, superintendents, principals, and school councils are in the governance

game

together.

success

—

Each plays a

part in a collective enterprise that is

the educational achievement of students.

A

judged on

critical task is to

its

overall

combine

this

collective accountability with the individual accountability of the corporate model.

requires a

means of assessment

that discriminates

It

between the collective and individual

responsibilities of governance actors. Principals, for example, are individually account-

able for their school buildings, but they are joined
all

by other governance players

in over-

accountability for the educational performance of students. Measuring and assessing

such distinctions
theless, this is

nance.

is difficult, as is

establishing an acceptable system of rewards. Never-

an important task that

lies at

the heart of improving educational gover-
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Appendix A

Survey Methodology

A

survey questionnaire was mailed to all Massachusetts school committee members, superintendents, and principals in the fall of 1996. School committee members received
theirs in a quarterly mailing from the Massachusetts Association of School Committees,
superintendents and principals in a regular Massachusetts Department of Education mailing. Several questions were open-ended, while others used a five-point scale to assess the
respondents' impressions. Questions also sought information regarding various demographic and other background characteristics of the respondents. The response rate was as
follows:

Surveys
Mailed

Responses

2,200

391

280

138

Principals

1,830

Total

4,310

428
957

School Committee

Members

Superintendents

Received

Percentage
Returned
18 percent
49 percent
23 percent
22 percent

Available demographic data for the entire population of each governance group form the
comments on the representativeness of the responses.
School Committee Members. Compared with a 1995 membership survey conducted by
the Massachusetts Association of School Committees as characteristic of the entire state
population, my respondents are representative in terms of gender and education. Distribution of males and females in both is roughly equal, and approximately 50 percent of the
respondents and the school committee population have graduate or professional degrees.
In years of service, however, my group is more experienced. Among them, 58 percent had
five or more years of service on a school committee, whereas the comparable figure for the
basis for the following

state total is

34 percent..

Superintendents. Population characteristics for this group are based on an annual survey
conducted by the Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents.
survey
group is representative in terms of age and size of school district. Among both respondents and the state population of superintendents, 34 percent are between the ages of 36
and 50, while 66 percent are 51 or older. By school district, 66 percent of my sample and
69 percent of the state population are superintendents of districts with enrollments between 1,000 and 5,000. In terms of years in their current governance role, my respondents
are more experienced than the typical total state population. Among all superintendents,
44 percent have been in their jobs for 1 to 3 years and 39 percent for 4 to 10 years. In my
survey, the comparable percentages are 24 percent and 52 percent, respectively. Again, as
with school committee members, my respondents are somewhat more experienced than
the overall state population.
Principals. The Massachusetts Department of Education reports that the gender distribution of state principals is 64 percent male and 36 percent female; my respondents reported

My

identical figures.
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